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BOX 4 NON-TARIFF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES AND SPANISH EXPORTS
Protectionist policies most commonly take the form of import 
taxes or tariffs. The negative impact of tariffs on trade flows and 
economic welfare has been extensively analysed in the economic 
literature.1 Measures of this type have come into the spotlight due 
to announcements such as the introduction of import tariffs on 
steel and aluminium in the United States.2 In principle, the direct 
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1  See for example Lileeva, A. and D. Trefler (2010) “Improved Access to 
Foreign Markets Raises Plant-level Productivity for Some Plants,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1051-1099.
2  On 8 March, the US Department of Commerce imposed import tariffs on 
steel and aluminium (of 25% and 10%, respectively), from which 
European Union (EU), Canadian and Mexican exports were exempted. 
However, at the end of May the suspension of that exemption from 1 
June was announced.
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impact of this decision should be relatively small. That said, the 
consequences for world trade and economic activity may end up 
being severe if the measure triggers successive rounds of mutual 
retaliation measures between the countries involved.
This box, however, draws attention to another type of protectionist 
policies, of a non-tariff nature, which are less transparent and have 
been subject to less analysis in the economic literature. This non-
tariff protectionism has been much used by various developed 
countries in recent times. We analyse below the recent increase in 
the number of non-tariff barriers in order to shed light on how this 
kind of protectionism may affect Spanish exports.
Non-tariff barriers may take diverse forms, including, for example, 
financial aid to national industries, the inclusion of conditions in 
public procurements which lead to effective constraints on foreign 
competitors or the imposition of phytosanitary requirements on 
imported products. Chart 1 of the chart shows the increase in the 
number of non-tariff protectionist measures by developed economies, 
adopted in some cases in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the 
global crisis on their national industries.3 The United States has 
been particularly active in the use of measures of this type, as can 
be seen in Chart 2. Thus, while China and Spain have introduced 
around 300 non-tariff trade barriers since 2009, the United States 
has implemented in that time more than 1,400 new protectionist 
measures of this nature.
Regarding imports from Spain, since 2009 the United States has 
imposed a total of 546 restrictive measures (Chart 3). By contrast, 
sales of Spanish products to other destinations have generally 
faced a smaller number of new non-tariff barriers. Thus, for 
example, in that same period China has implemented 131  new 
protectionist measures affecting Spanish exports. From a sectoral 
standpoint, the products most strongly protected by the United 
States through measures of this type are basic metals (see 
Chart 4), which have been identified by that country as one of the 
areas most affected by international competition. This is illustrated 
by the fiscal expansion package “American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009”, which imposed the condition that all 
steel and aluminium products used under the programme had to 
be of US manufacture. This same requirement has been imposed 
again more recently in other legislation such as the “New York Buy 
American Act” of 2017 passed by the state of New York or the 
public tender for the installation of railway security systems called 
by the Department of Transport in 2018.
To quantify the possible impact of this kind of protectionism on 
Spanish exports, we used, firstly, the compilation of non-tariff 
measures of the Global Trade Alert Project for each combination of 
product, country and year4 and, secondly, the microeconomic 
information on firm, product, country and year drawn from the 
Banco de España’s registers of cross-border transactions between 
2009 and 2013. This information can be used to compare the 
behaviour of a firm’s exports of a given product to two different 
countries: one which has imposed a non-tariff constraint on 
imports of that product and another which has not.
The results indicate that the growth of exports to a country 
imposing a non-tariff barrier is 3.1 pp lower than that of exports of 
the same firm and the same product to other countries. This 
negative effect is economically significant, taking into account that 
the annual average growth of exports observed in the aforementioned 
period 2009-2013 is 6.5%.5 Chart 5 shows how, in the absence of 
new non-tariff barriers, aggregate annual growth of Spanish 
exports in nominal terms would have been around 14%, compared 
with the 11% observed.6
It should be noted that the new generation of trade agreements 
negotiated recently by the European Union with its trading partners 
tend to reduce both non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and, in 
general, any barriers which constrain the movement of goods, 
services, persons and investment flows, without neglecting to 
include rules on the environment, the labour markets or intellectual 
property rights.7 In this respect, by way of counterbalancing the 
increase in non-tariff measures in certain developed countries, the 
negotiations under way between the European Union and Latin 
American destinations such as MERCOSUR or Mexico may, if they 
culminate in full free trade agreements, benefit Spanish firms 
especially, given their experience in some sectors with high potential 
growth in these countries, such as public works, and their closer 
cultural affinity, already apparent in their greater trade presence in 
those areas compared with the rest of the EU (see Chart  6). To 
illustrate this, in the first year after Ecuador’s signature in January 
2017 of the European Union’s free trade agreement with Colombia 
and Peru, Spanish exports to this country rose by 47%, compared 
with growth of 4.8% of the exports of Germany, France and Italy.
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3  The source of information on non-tariff measures is the Global Trade 
Alert Project: https://www.globaltradealert.org/. Since it is difficult to 
assign them a monetary value, their measurement is based on the 
number of measures adopted, regardless of the value of the imports 
affected by each measure.
4  See footnote 2.
5  Note that this rate refers to the unweighted annual average growth of 
firm-country-product flows in nominal terms. Since it is an unweighted 
average, it does not coincide with the aggregate annual growth.
6  Readers interested in this analysis can find more details in Banco de 
España Working Paper 1814 “The costs of trade protectionism: evidence 
from Spanish firms and non-tariff measures”.
7  For more details of agreements of this type in general and of that with 
Canada in particular, see the Analytical Article of the Banco de España 
“The EU’s new-generation trade agreements: the CETA treaty”.
